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We investigate the eﬀect of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic
welfare. In particular, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of wage and health insurance
determination that yields implications that are empirically observed. Namely, not all jobs provide
health insurance and jobs with insurance pay higher wages than those without insurance. Using
data from the 1990 to 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we ﬁnd that
jobs that do provide health insurance last almost ﬁve times longer than jobs that do not. While this
implies that the mobility rate for jobs without insurance is signiﬁcantly higher than the mobility
rate for jobs with insurance, this diﬀerence is welfare enhancing since jobs with health insurance
are more productive jobs. Furthermore, simulations reveal that decreasing the health insurance
premium paid by employers increases the steady state health insurance coverage rate, decreases the
unemployment rate, but may or may not lead to productivity gains in the economy.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Health insurance is most often received through one’s employer in the United States. According to
U.S. Census Bureau statistics, almost 85% of Americans with private health insurance gain their
coverage through the labor market. The connection between employment decisions and health insur-
ance coverage has generated a substantial amount of interest, among labor and health economists,
in the possible explanations for and impacts of this linkage. One branch of the literature has inves-
tigated the relationship between employer-provided health insurance and job mobility. In spite of
a substantial amount of research on the issue, the relationship between health insurance coverage
and mobility rates has not as yet been satisfactorially explained. Basing their arguments largely on
anecdotal evidence, many proponents of healthcare reform, including President Clinton, claim that
the present employment-based system causes some workers to remain in jobs they would rather
leave since they are “locked in” to their source of health insurance. While it is true that individ-
uals with employer-provided health insurance are less likely to change jobs than other individuals
(Mitchell, 1982; Cooper and Manheit, 1993), the claim that health insurance is the cause of this
result has not been established. Madrian (1994) estimates that health insurance leads to a 25
percent reduction in worker mobility, while Holtz-Eakin (1994) ﬁnds no eﬀect, even though they
use the identical methodology. Building on their approach, Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) and
Anderson (1997) arrive at a reduction in worker mobility slightly larger than Madrian’s estimate,
while Kapur (1998) concludes there is no distortion due to health insurance. The most recent
and only paper in this literature that attempts to explicitly model worker decisions, Gilleskie and
Lutz (1999), ﬁnds that employment-based health insurance leads to no reduction in mobility for
married males and a relatively small (10 percent) reduction in mobility for single males. Using
statewide variation in continuation of coverage mandates, Gruber and Madrian (1994) ﬁnd that an
additional year of coverage signiﬁcantly increases mobility which they claim establishes that health
insurance does indeed cause reductions in mobility. It must be noted that while this literature has
extensively examined how the employment-based system aﬀects mobility, the more pressing welfare
implications have largely been ignored (Gruber and Madrian, 1997; Gruber and Hanratty, 1995 are
notable exceptions).
If health insurance coverage is perceived as strictly a nonpecuniary characteristic of the job,
like a corner oﬃce or reserved parking space, the theory of compensating diﬀerentials would predict
a negative relationship between the cost (or provision) of health insurance and wages. Somewhat
surprisingly, Monheit et al. (1985) estimates a positive relationship. Subsequent research attempted
to exploit exogenous variation from a variety of sources in order to accurately identify the “eﬀect”
of health insurance on wages. Gruber (1994) uses statewide variation in mandated maternity
beneﬁts, Gruber and Krueger (1990) employ industry and state variation in the cost of worker’s
compensation insurance, and Eberts and Stone (1985) rely on school district variation in health
insurance costs to estimate the manner in which wages are aﬀected. All three conclude that most
(more than 80%) of the cost of the beneﬁt is reﬂected in lower wages. In addition, Miller (1995)
estimates signiﬁcant wage decreases for individuals moving from a job without insurance to a job
with insurance. Hence, the research that examines to what extent health insurance costs are passed
on to employees ﬁnds that a majority of the costs are borne by employees in the form of lower wages.
These results from the two branches of the literature seem inconsistent on the face of it. If
individuals are bearing the cost of the health insurance being provided to them by their employer,
why are they apparently less likely to leave these jobs? In addition, the absence of a conceptual
framework that is consistent with many of the empirical ﬁndings on job lock and the indirect costs
1of health insurance to workers means that few policy implications can be drawn from the empirical
results that have been obtained.
In this paper we attempt to provide such a framework by developing and estimating an equilib-
rium model of employer-provided health insurance and wage determination. The model is based on
a continuous-time stationary search model in which unemployed and employed agents stochastically
uncover employment opportunities characterized in terms of idiosyncratic match values. Firms and
searchers then engage in Nash bargaining to divide the surpluses from each potential employment
match. In contrast to traditional matching-bargaining models (e.g., Flinn and Heckman, 1982;
Diamond, 1982; and Pissarides, 1985), we allow employee compensation to vary over both wages
and health insurance coverage. In our framework, health insurance coverage is not viewed as a form
of nonpecuniary compensation, but rather as an endogenously-determined property of an employ-
ment contract that has a direct impact on the value of the match to both workers and ﬁrms. Since
an employment contract may terminate due to the poor health of the employee, we view health
insurance coverage as reducing the rate of “exogenous” terminations from this source. Starting
from this premise, we are able to derive a number of implications from the model that coincide
with both anecdotal and empirical evidence. Most basically, the model implies that not all jobs will
provide health insurance, workers “pay” for health insurance in the form of lower wages, and jobs
with health insurance coverage tend to last longer than those without (both unconditionally and
conditionally on wage rates).
Using data from the 1990 to 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), we ﬁnd broad conformity with the implications of the model. In particular, the average
duration of jobs that provide health insurance is ﬁve times greater than for jobs that do not.
Estimates of the model imply a steady-state health insurance coverage rate of 58 percent and
a steady-state coverage rate among workers of 70 percent. These rates are similar to estimates
published by the Census bureau that are based on the same dataset.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present three versions of a
search-theoretic model of the labor market with matching and bargaining. To set ideas, we begin
by outlining the standard model in which ﬁrms only make wage oﬀers to all searchers and there
is no on-the-job (OTJ) search. We then extend the model to allow for the provision of health
insurance. In the ﬁrst extension, we do not allow workers to meet new employers and hence job-
to-job transitions are ruled out; the second extension is to allow on-the-job search. In this case we
can explicitly analyze the phenomenon of “job lock” and determine whether it implies ineﬃciency
in the labor market. Section 3 contains a discussion of the data used to estimate the equilibrium
model, while section 4 develops the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical
results and policy simulations associated with changing the health insurance premium. In section 6
we conclude and discuss extensions to the model that would be particularly valuable for performing
more sophisticated policy analyses than are possible within the present framework.
2 A Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determina-
tion
In this section we describe the behavioral model of labor market search with matching and bar-
gaining. The model is formulated in continuous time and assumes stationarity of the labor market
environment. In the ﬁrst subsection, we derive the decision rules for terminating search (by accept-
ing employment) and for dividing the match value between worker and ﬁrm when health insurance
2is not an option. In the second subsection, we describe the manner in which we introduce health
insurance options into the model and derive the appropriate decision rules for this case.
Throughout we assume that there exists an invariant, technologically-determined distribution
of worker-ﬁrm productivity levels which is given by G(θ). All individuals begin their lives in the
nonemployment state, and we assume that it is optimal for them to search. The instantaneous utility
ﬂow in the nonemployment state is b, which can be positive or negative. When an unemployed
searcher and a ﬁrm meet, which happens at rate λ, the productive value of the match (θ) is
immediately observed by both the applicant and the ﬁrm. At this point a division of the match
value is proposed using a Nash bargaining framework. In the ﬁrst two versions of the model
considered we do not allow for on-the-job search, without this phenomenon the basic structure of
the model is clearer and comparative statics results are more easily derived. However, these models
cannot be used to investigate the phenomenon of job lock and are clearly counterfactual, since a
high proportion of jobs end with immediate entry into employment with a new ﬁrm. When we do
allow for on-the-job search, we assume that employed individuals meet potential new employers at
the constant rate λe.
Given the nature of the data available to us (from the supply side of the market), ﬁrms are
treated as relatively passive agents throughout. In particular, we assume that the only factor
of production is labor, and that total output of the ﬁrm is simply the sum of the productivity
levels of all of its employees. Then if the ﬁrm “passes” on the applicant — that is, does not make
an employment oﬀer — its “disagreement” outcome is 0 [it earns no revenue but makes no wage
payment]. With the additional assumption that there are no ﬁxed costs of employment to ﬁrms,
the implication is that employment contracts are negotiated between workers and ﬁrms on an
individualistic basis, that is, without reference to the composition of the ﬁrm’s current workforce.
2.1 Labor Market Decisions without Health Insurance
The model considered in this section assumes that there is no on-the-job search and that health
insurance is either oﬀered to no employees (or all of them). The potential employee’s disagreement
value is the value of continued search, which we denote Vn. For any given value of Vn there exists a
corresponding critical match value θ∗ = ρVn, which has the property that all matches with values
greater than θ∗ will result in employment while all those matches of lower value will not. For any
θ ≥ θ∗, the wage oﬀer is given by
w(θ,Vn) = argmax







where without loss of generality it has been assumed that the ﬁrm shares the employee’s eﬀective
rate of discount, ρ + η.
The value of employment at a wage of w is easily determined. Consider an inﬁnitesimally small
period of time ∆t. Over this “period,” either the individual will continue to be employed at wage











where the term (1 + ρ∆t)
−1is an “inﬁnitesimal” discount factor associated with the small interval
∆t, η∆t is the approximate probability of being terminated from one’s current employment by the
3end of ∆t, Vn is the value of being nonemployed, and o(∆t) is a term which has the property that
lim∆t→0 (o(∆t)/∆t)=0 . Note that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of [2] is the value of the
wage payment over the interval, which is the total payment w∆t multiplied by the “instantaneous”
discount factor [think of the payment as being received at the end of the interval ∆t]. After





We now substitute [3] into [1] so as to simplify the problem as follows:










w [w − ρVn]
α [θ − w]
1−α
= αθ +( 1− α)ρVn. (4)
We can now move onto computing the value of nonemployment. Using the same setup as above









max[Vn,V e (w(θ,Vn))] dG(θ)
+(1− λ∆t) Vn} + o(∆t), (5)
where λ∆t is the approximate probability of encountering one potential employer over the interval.
Rearranging and taking limits, we have
ρVn = b + λ

ρVn
[Ve (w(θ,Vn)) − Vn] dG(θ).
Since
Ve (w(θ,Vn)) =











Then the ﬁnal (implicit) expression for the value of search is





[θ − ρVn] dG(θ). (6)
4Note that this expression is identical to the expression for the reservation value in a model with no
bargaining when θ is the payment to the individual except for the presence of the factor α. This is
not unexpected, since when α =1 , the entire match value is transferred to the worker and search
over θ is the same as search over w.
Now we can summarize the important properties of the model. The critical “match” value θ∗
is equal to ρVn, which is deﬁned by [6]. Since at this match value the wage payment is equal to
w∗ = w(θ∗,V n)=αθ∗ +( 1− α)θ∗ = θ∗, the reservation wage is identical to the reservation match
value. The probability that a random encounter generates an acceptable match is given by ˜ G(θ∗),
where ˜ G denotes the survivor function. The rate of leaving unemployment is λ ˜ G(θ∗). As we can
see from [6], since θ∗ is a decreasing function of α, rates of unemployment are higher when searchers
have more bargaining power.
The observed wage density is a simple mapping from the matching density. Since
w(θ,Vn)=αθ +( 1− α)θ∗
⇒ ˜ θ(w,Vn)=
w − (1 − α)θ∗
α
, (7)




˜ G(θ∗) w ≥ θ∗
0 w<θ ∗.
. (8)
2.2 Bargaining with Health Insurance (No OTJ Search)
There are many reasons that individuals and families positively value employer-provided health
insurance. We abstract from virtually all of them and use a modeling framework that provides a
rationale for both ﬁrms and workers to simultaneously make health insurance provision choices. In
particular, our model posits cooperative behavior between workers and ﬁrms in which an eﬃcient
choice of whether or not to purchase health insurance is made conditional on the value of the match.
The model described above took the rate of termination of matches to be exogenous; we now allow
the worker-ﬁrm pair to alter this dissolution rate through the purchase of health insurance for the
worker. We take the rate of dissolution of the match to partially be determined by the health
status of the worker; health insurance increases the worker’s utilization rate of medical services and
increases her general health status. The instantaneous health insurance premium is equal to φ. If
purchased, the match dissolution rate decreases from η0, the rate without insurance, to η1. Thus
matches with health insurance are, on average, longer than matches without health insurance. Due
to the stationary environment, if health insurance is purchased to cover a particular match at any
instant in time it will always be purchased. Therefore the exogenous rate of dissolution will be
constant over the course of a particular employment match and take values in the set {η0,η1}.
The value of the Nash bargaining objective function is given by
S (w,d;θ,Vn)={Ve(w,d) − Vn}
α

θ − w − dφ
ρ + dη1 +( 1− d)η0
1−α
, (9)
given any wage w and health insurance provision choice d, where d is equal to 1 when health
insurance is purchased and otherwise is equal to 0. Then the solution to the problem is given by
5the mapping
(w∗,d ∗)(θ,Vn) = argmax
w,d
S (w,d;θ,Vn).
Solving for the equilibrium contract value is most easily accomplished by ﬁrst solving for an optimal
w given a θ, Vn, and health insurance status d, for both cases d =0and d =1 . That is, let
ˆ w(δ,θ,Vn) = argmax
w S (w,d = δ;θ,Vn),δ=0 ,1,
and
ˆ S (δ,θ,Vn)=S (ˆ w(δ,θ,Vn),δ;θ,Vn),
so that ˆ w(δ,θ,Vn) is the optimal wage oﬀer given health insurance status δ and ˆ S (δ,θ,Vn) is
the maximum value of the Nash bargaining problem given health insurance status δ. Deﬁne the
diﬀerence between the optimal value of the problem given health insurance insurance and the
optimal value when it is not by
Q(θ,Vn)=ˆ S (1,θ,V n) − ˆ S (0,θ,V n)
The optimal contract is then given by
(w∗,d ∗)(θ,Vn)=

(ˆ w(0,θ,V n),0) ⇔ Q(θ,ρVn) < 0
(ˆ w(1,θ,V n),1) ⇔ Q(θ,ρVn) ≥ 0
.
The solution to the problem is both relatively easy to derive and intuitive. Conditioning on θ,
Vn, and a health insurance status of d =0 , we have
ˆ w(0,θ,V n)=αθ +( 1− α)ρVn, (10)
so that
ˆ S (0,θ,V n)=

αθ +( 1− α)ρVn − ρVn
ρ + η0
α 
















Similarly, with health insurance with an instantaneous premium of φ, we have














α(θ − φ − ρVn)
ρ + η1
α 




αα (1 − α)
1−α
ρ + η1
(θ − φ − ρVn).
6Now note that
Q(θ,Vn)=αα (1 − α)
1−α








αα (1 − α)
1−α
(ρ + η1)(ρ + η0)
[(η0 − η1)(θ − ρVn) − (ρ + η0)φ].
Since η0 − η1 > 0,∂ Q(θ,Vn)/∂θ > 0. Therefore there exists a unique critical value θ∗∗ such that
0=Q(θ∗∗,V n)









To summarize, given a value of Vn any match value of θ ≥ θ∗ will be acceptable. An acceptable
match value θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗) will result in a job without health insurance while a job with θ ∈ [θ∗∗,∞)
will carry health insurance.
The ﬁnal task is to characterize the value of search Vn. After a bit of manipulation, we can
write the steady state value of nonemployment in this case as















(θ − φ − ρVn) dG(θ)}.
With this value of Vn, the speciﬁcation of the health insurance problem is complete.
The distribution of accepted wage-health insurance pairs is deﬁned as follows. Given that






















φ represents the smallest possible wage for a job that provides health



























φ. The wage wmin
0 is the minimum paid at jobs without
health insurance, while wmax
0 represents the maximum possible wage at an uninsured job. Since the





7the unconditional (w,d) distribution is
m(w,d)=

     





































Since η0 − η1 > 0, then wmax
0 >w min
1 and there exits an interval of wages that both jobs with and
without health insurance will pay even though there is perfect separation in θ space between match
values that result in health insurance provision and those that don’t. The size of this interval
of overlap in wage space is most directly related to the size of the insurance premium and the
bargaining power of searchers (α).
The marginal wage density is then
m(w)=

     








































Figures 1through 4 represent some of the features of the model in a graphical and easily
understood form. The model parameters used to prepare the graphs are based on estimates of the
equilibrium model obtained when using SIPP data.1
Figure 1plots an estimated productivity p.d.f. which is assumed to belong to the log normal
family of distributions. The lower dotted line represents the critical match value for leaving unem-
ployment, θ∗, which is estimated to be approximately 4.91. The dotted line to the right represents
θ∗∗, which is the critical match value for the match to provide health insurance coverage (its es-
timated value is 14.80). The likelihood that an unemployed searcher who encounters a potential
employer will accept a job is the area to the right of θ∗. The likelihood that an unemployed searcher
accepts a job that doesn’t provide health insurance is then given by the probability mass in the area
between the two critical values divided by the probability of ﬁnding an acceptable match, which in
this case is about 70 percent.
In Figure 2 we plot the equilibrium mapping from match values into (w,d) pairs. The mapping
begins at the match value θ∗ and is increasing in θ up to the value θ∗∗. At this value there is
a downword shift due to the cost of health insurance provision, with the mapping resuming its
monotonicity in θ for all values greater than θ∗∗.
The wage densities conditional on health insurance status are displayed in Figure 3. We can
clearly discern the area of overlap between these two densities. Since both these p.d.f.s are derived
from slightly diﬀerent mappings of the same p.d.f. g(θ), it is not surprising that they share general
features in terms of shape. Note that the wage density conditional on not having health insurance
1The estimates are taken from the speciﬁcation of the model in which employed agents are allowed to meet new
potential employers. Therefore the wage functions and hazard rates out of jobs conditional on health insurance status
refer to the ﬁrst jobs accepted after an unemployment spell. We will discuss how the phenomenon of on-the-job search
impacts the mapping between match values and wages for currently employed searchers in the next section.
8is always deﬁned on a closed interval [wmin
0 ,wmax
0 ], while the range of wages conditional on having
health insurance is unbounded so long as G has unbounded support.
In Figure 4 we plot the marginal wage density. The interval of overlap in the wage distribution
adds a “bulge” to a density that otherwise resembles the parent log normal density. Recall that
wages in the interval of the bulge are the only ones that can be either associated with health
insurance or not. Wages in the right tail are always associated with jobs that provide health
insurance while those to the left of the bulge are associated with jobs that do not provide health
insurance.
We conclude this subsection by deriving some comparative static results for a number of impor-
tant characteristics of the labor market. The characteristics in which we are particularly interested
are the probability that a job includes health insurance, p(d =1 ) , the steady state unemployment
rate, denoted u, and the steady state health insurance coverage rate, denoted h. We have shown
that it is possible to characterize the equilibrium of the model in terms of the two critical values θ∗
and θ∗∗. Our ﬁrst result establishes the relationship between these values and the cost of providing
health insurance, φ. We focus on the relationship between the equilibrium wage-health insurance
distribution and the cost of providing health insurance since any policy aimed at increasing the
incidence of health insurance coverage will attempt to change the cost of health insurance coverage.
Proposition 1. ∂θ∗
∂φ < 0 and ∂θ∗∗
∂φ > 0.
Proof. Deﬁne the implicit function
T (θ∗,φ)=R(θ∗,φ) − θ∗ =0
where















(θ − φ − θ∗) dG(θ)}






































⇒ Tθ∗ < 0

















9By equation [16], we ﬁnd that ∂θ∗
∂φ < 0. Next, we know that the critical productivity levels are
linked according to the equation














∂φ ∈ (−1,0) and
ρ+η0
η0−η1 ≥ 1, then ∂θ∗∗
∂φ > 0.
As the health insurance premium decreases the critical productivity level that results in a job
match increases, which implies that the probability that an encounter between a searcher and a
potential employer results in a job match,  G(θ∗), also decreases. As a result, the mean time spent
in unemployment will increase as the health insurance premium decreases.
We can now derive the eﬀect of health insurance premiums on the probability that a new job will
be oﬀer health insurance coverage, p(d =1 ). In addition, the next proposition shows how changes in
the health insurance premium aﬀect the steady state unemployment and health insurance coverage




















Then u can be interpreted as the proportion of the labor market career an individual spends in
the unemployment state (for suﬃciently long careers) and h can be thought of as the proportion of
one’s labor market career in which they are covered by health insurance.
Proposition 2. The economic indicators are related to the health insurance premium as
follows: (a)
∂p(d=1)
∂φ < 0, (b) ∂u
∂φ cannot be unambiguously signed and (c) ∂h
∂φ < 0.
Proof. Given the equation, p(d =1 )=
˜ G(θ∗∗)


















∂φ < 0 and ∂θ∗∗
∂φ > 0, we know
∂p(d=1)
∂φ < 0.

























































< 0.S i n c e∂θ∗∗
∂φ > 0 and ∂θ∗
∂φ < 0, the sign of ∂u
∂φ depends on
all of the parameters of the model (as they eﬀect both θ∗ and θ∗∗) and the productivity density
function, g (θ).
























































∂φ > 0 and ∂θ∗
∂φ < 0, the second expression in parentheses is always positive. Hence,
∂h
∂φ < 0.
Proposition 2 establishes the fact that as the health insurance premium decreases, the probabil-
ity that a worker-ﬁrm match that results in a job that provides health insurance coverage increases.
In addition, this proposition highlights the fact that while a decrease in the health insurance pre-
mium faced by employers unambiguously increases the steady state health insurance coverage rate,
the unemployment rate may increase or decrease. We shall consider these impacts again using the
estimated model parameters in Section 5.
2.2.1 Bargaining with Health Insurance (with OTJ Search)
In the previous subsection we assumed that there was no contact between employed individuals
and new potential employers. Given the large number of job to job transitions in our data, such an
assumption is clearly counterfactual. In this subsection we generalize the model to allow for such
meetings, which are assumed to occur at the exogenously-determined rate λe. By ﬁxing the rate
of arrival of meetings, we have made the rate independent of the individual’s current match value
and their current contract as characterized by their wage and health insurance coverage status. For
simplicity, we assume that on-the-job search is costless.
As was assumed in the case of nonemployed search, when a currently-employed individual meets
a new potential employer, both sides immediately observe the value of the (new) potential match
θ. Whether or not the individual leaves the old ﬁrm for the new one and the nature of the new
11employment contract given that there is one depend critically on the information sets of the old
and new ﬁrm and the nature of the bargaining process. We assume that (1) the individual knows
the value of θ and θ; (2) the current employer knows θ but not θ; and (3) the potential employer
knows θ but not θ. Each ﬁrm is assumed to make a series of credible and binding wage and
health insurance provision oﬀers to the employee that can be communicated to the other ﬁrm.
The bargaining process ends when one ﬁrm drops out of the bidding, which will occur when the
rents from employing the worker to that ﬁrm reach zero. As long as the oﬀers made through
the bargaining process are unique mappings from the match value at the current ﬁrm and the
best oﬀer currently on the table from its competitor, then in the end of the process the match
values of each ﬁrm will be revealed. The sequential bargaining process and gradual revelation of
information serves to ensure that the ﬁrm with the “dominated” match value doesn’t drop out of
the competition too quickly.
Let us introduce a bit of notation before proceeding. For an employed agent, we denote their
current labor market state by (θ,w,d) and any potential new state by (θ,w,d ). When an indi-
vidual is unemployed, for purposes of deﬁning the equilibrium wage and health insurance provision
functions we will say that their current match value is θ∗, which is that value of θ required for an
unemployed searcher and a ﬁrm to initiate an employment contract. We start by considering the
rent division problem facing a currently employed agent who encounters a new potential employer.
Say that a currently-employed agent with current contract given by (θ,w,d),θ≥ θ∗, meets a
new potential employment match with value θ. We assume that the potential match will only be
reported to the current employer if the employee has an incentive to do so. One situation in which
this will clearly be the case is when θ >θ .When this occurs, we assume that the bargaining process
is characterized by a sequence of bids, by the current and potential employer, for the individual’s
services. The bidding stops when the surplus value of the match to one of the ﬁrms reaches 0 [this
is clearly the current employer when θ >θ ]. How are the bids determined? Let the maximal value
of the match θ to the worker be given by Q(θ). Then the solution to the Nash bargaining problem
when θ >θis given by
S(θ,w,d ,θ)={Ve(θ,w,d ) − Q(θ)}α
×Vf(θ,w,d )1−α,
where Vf(θ,w,d ) denotes the new ﬁrm’s value of the problem [recall that each ﬁrm’s threat point
is assumed to be zero]. For the moment, we will simply posit the existence of a employment contract
outcome that is a function of the highest and the next best match value; if these values are θ and ˜ θ,
respectively, then the wage function is w(θ,˜ θ) and the health insurance provision function is d(θ,˜ θ).
Then the ﬁrm’s value of the current match situation is deﬁned as follows:
Vf(θ,w,d)=























12where ˆ θ(w,d) is deﬁned as the maximum value of θ for which the contract (w,d) would leave the
ﬁrm with no proﬁt. Any encounter with a potential ﬁrm in which the match value is less than
ˆ θ(w,d) will not be reported by the employee. After rearranging terms and taking limits, we have
Vf(θ,w,d)=[ ρ + η(d)+λe ˜ G(ˆ θ(w,d))]−1
×{θ − w − dφ + λe
 θ
ˆ θ(w,d)
Vf(θ,w(θ,˜ θ),d(θ,˜ θ))dG(˜ θ)}.
For the employee, the value of employment at a current match value θ and wage and health































Note that when an employee encounters a ﬁrm with a new match value lower than his current one
but that is capable of being used to increase the value of his current employment contract [i.e.,
θ>˜ θ>ˆ θ(w,d)], her new value of employment at the current ﬁrm becomes Ve(θ,w(θ,˜ θ),d(θ,˜ θ)).
Instead, when the match value at the newly-contacted ﬁrm exceeds that of the current ﬁrm, mobility
results. The value of employment at the new ﬁrm is given by Ve(˜ θ,w(˜ θ,θ),d(˜ θ,θ)) — that is, the
match value at the current ﬁrm becomes the determinant of the “threat point” faced by the new
ﬁrm and plays a role in the determination of the new wage. Finally, when the match value at the
new ﬁrm is less than ˆ θ(w,d), the contact is not reported to the current ﬁrm since it would not
result in any improvement in the current contract. Because of this selective reporting, the value
of employment contracts must be monotonically increasing both within and across consecutive job
spells. Declines can only be observed following a transition into the unemployment state.
After rearranging terms and taking limits, we have
Ve(θ,w,d)=[ ρ + η(d)+λe ˜ G(ˆ θ(w,d))]−1
×{w + η(d)Vn + λe
 θ
ˆ θ(w,d)




Ve(˜ θ,w(˜ θ,θ),d(˜ θ,θ))dG(˜ θ)}.
With a new match value of θ >θ ,the surplus attained by the individual at the new match with
respect to the value she could attain at the old match after extracting all of the surplus associated
with it is
Ve(θ,w,d ) − Q(θ),
13where
Q(θ)=Ve(θ,w∗(θ),d ∗(θ)),
with (w∗,d ∗)(θ) denoting the value of the wage and health insurance if the agent receives all the
rents from the match θ. Note that w∗(θ) ≡ w(θ,θ) and d∗(θ) ≡ d(θ,θ). Therefore




Ve(˜ θ,w(˜ θ,θ),d(˜ θ,θ))dG(˜ θ)},
where we have used the fact that ˆ θ(w∗(θ),d ∗(θ)) = θ.
The model is closed after specifying the value of nonemployment. Passing directly to the steady
state representation of this function, we have




Ve(˜ θ,w(˜ θ,θ∗),d(˜ θ,θ∗))dG(˜ θ)},
where θ∗ is the critical match value associated with the decision to initiate an employment contract.
When an employed agent meets a new potential employer, the solution to the Nash bargaining




and as we have noted above, (w∗,d ∗)(θ)=( w,d)(θ,θ). When an unemployed agent meets an




where Sn(θ,w,d,θ∗)=( Ve(θ,w,d) − Vn)αVf(θ,w,d)1−α.
We note that an important characteristic of our model is eﬃcient bargaining, that is, when con-
fronted with a choice between two employers with associated match values θ and θ, the individual
always takes employment with the employer associated with the higher match value. This property
is an attractive one for an equilibrium model to have, and also aids in reducing the complexity of
solving the model. We begin by positing a few characteristics of the equilibrium functions (w,d)
which we will later conﬁrm to hold in equilibrium.
Conjecture 1 d(θ,θ)=1⇔ θ ≥ θ∗∗.
In words, the decision to provide health insurance is only a function of the current best match
value and not of the next-best option. There exists a critical value, here called θ∗∗, which fully
characterizes the health insurance provision outcome exactly as was true in the model without OTJ
search. The reason for this result is related to the fact that the payoﬀs for the ﬁrm and worker
from buying health insurance given current match value θ are both positive when θ ≥ θ∗∗, and
are both negative when this is not the case.
14Given this result, the complete characterization of the equilibrium is considerably simpliﬁed.
Given knowledge (or a guess) of the critical values θ∗ and θ∗∗, we can deﬁne the “conditional” Nash
bargaining problem by
w(θ,θ;θ∗,θ∗∗)=a r gm a x
w S(θ,w,χ[θ ≥ θ∗∗],θ)
for the case of a currently employed searcher and
w(θ,θ∗;θ∗,θ∗∗) = argmax
w Sn(θ,w,χ[θ ≥ θ∗∗],θ∗)
for the case of an unemployed searcher. The “boundary condition” associated with the equilibrium
wage oﬀer function is
w∗(θ;θ∗,θ∗∗)=w(θ,θ;θ∗,θ∗∗)
To solve the equilibrium requires that we search over scalars θ∗ and θ∗∗ and functions w(θ,θ;θ∗,θ∗∗)
to solve the ﬁxed point equations implicitly deﬁned by the value functions Ve,V n, and Vf.
The model is suﬃciently complex that comparative statics results are hard to come by. Instead,
we will concern ourselves with displaying some of the implications of the model, particularly those
that diﬀer from the earlier version without on-the-job search.
The current version of the model more closely corresponds with the types of events seen in the
SIPP data, and moreover is the only one that can be used to look at the issue of job lock. In the
model without OTJ search, the exit rate from jobs with health insurance was tautologically lower
than from jobs with health insurance, and in both cases the rates were independent of job duration.
With OTJ search these implications are changed.
Though the model with OTJ search continues to tautologically imply higher nonvoluntary exits
from jobs without health insurance, there are now two possible routes by which a job spell may
end. Given eﬃcient separations, we know that voluntary exits from a job spell occur whenever a
job with a higher match value is located (independent of whether the current job provides health
insurance or not). The instantaneous exit rate of a job with match value θ (θ ≥ θ∗) is given by
r(θ)=η0χ[θ∗ ≤ θ<θ ∗∗]+η1χ[θ ≥ θ∗∗]+λe ˜ G(θ),
so that the duration of time that individuals spend in a job spell conditional on the current match
value is
fe(te|θ)=r(θ)exp(−r(θ)te),t e > 0.




The corresponding conditional hazard, he(te|d)=fe(te|d)/ ˜ Fe(te|d), exhibits negative duration de-
pendence for both d =0and d =1 . However, because η0 >η 1 and because the lowest value of θ for
d =1exceeds the greatest value of θ for d =0 , the hazard out of jobs covered by health insurance
exceeds the hazard out of jobs with health insurance at any value of te. Note that the limiting value
(as te →∞ ) for the hazard in jobs without health insurance is limt→∞ he(te|d =0 )=η0+λe ˜ G(θ∗∗),
while the corresponding limiting value for jobs with health insurance is limt→∞ he(te|d =1 )=η1.
15Using estimates of the OTJ search model, we have plotted the hazard functions and they appear
in Figure 5. Note that within each regime (deﬁned in terms of d), negative duration dependence is
implied through the operation of the well-known composition eﬀect (i.e., selection in terms of θ).
We also see that our model estimates imply substantial diﬀerences in the levels of the hazard rates
between jobs with health insurance and those without. These estimated diﬀerences of course stem
from the large diﬀerences observed in the data. Within our model, these diﬀerences do not indicate
that health insurance status distorts decision-making regarding job mobility as is often claimed in
the “job lock” literature.
3D a t a
Data from the 1990 to 1993 annual panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) are used to estimate the model. The SIPP interviews individuals every four months for up
to nine times, so that at the maximum an individual will have been interviewed relatively frequently
over a three year period. The SIPP collects detailed monthly information regarding individuals’
demographic characteristics and labor force activity, including earnings, number of weeks worked,
average hours worked, as well as whether the individual changed jobs during the month. In addition,
at each interview date the SIPP gathers data for a variety of health insurance variables including
whether an individual’s private health insurance is employer-provided.2 T h em o d e ld e v e l o p e di n
this paper assumes a homogeneous population, though it would not in principle be diﬃcult to allow
primitive parameters to depend on observable individual characteristics. Instead of doing so, we
have attempted to deﬁne a sample that is relatively homogeneous with respect to a number of
demographic characteristics. In particular, only whites between the ages of 22-39 with at least
a high school education have been selected. In addition, any individual who reports attendance
in school, self-employment, military service, or participation in any government welfare program
(i.e., AFDC, WIC, or Food Stamps) over the sample period is excluded.3 Although the format of
the SIPP data makes the task of deﬁning job changes fairly diﬃcult, in other respects the survey
information is well-suited to the requirements of this analysis since it follows individuals for up to
three years and includes data on both wages and health insurance at the current job.
In the empirical work reported below we estimate both the OTJ and no-OTJ search versions of
the model. Since the speciﬁcation without OTJ search cannot account for direct movements from
job to job, we only use information regarding the duration of time spent in the initial unemployment
spell, the duration of time spent in the ﬁrst job spell after unemployment, and the wage and health
insurance status of that ﬁrst job spell after unemployment. It is assumed, albeit incorrectly, that
the ﬁrst job terminates with an exit into unemployment. In contrast, when estimating the OTJ
search version of the model we use the same information except that we distinguish the manner by
which the ﬁrst job spell after unemployment was left. That is, for cases in which the end of the
ﬁrst job spell is observed, an indicator variable which takes the value one if the job was quit and
2There are several issues involved in constructing a meaningful employer-provided health insurance variable. First,
there is a timing problem since the insurance variable can change values only at the interview month,while a job
change can occur any time. Second,there are job spells in which the individual reports employer-provided coverage
for some part of the spell and no coverage for the remainder of the spell. Since these spells do not represent more
than 20% of the entire sample (of spells) and any other solution is admittedly ad hoc,we eliminate them. At present
we are investigating the sensitiity of our results to alternative treatments of this problem.
3Some individuals,about 3 percent of the sample,had missing data at some point during the panel. Since
estimation depends critically on having complete labor market histories we have excluded these cases.
16zero if the individual transited into unemployment is added to the other 4 dependent variables:
the duration of the unemployment spell, the duration of the ﬁrst job spell, and the wage rate and
health insurance status of the ﬁrst job spell.
Since there is no time invariant unobserved heterogeneity in the model (since θ draws are i.i.d.),
we construct labor market “cycles” in a manner similar to Wolpin (1992) and Flinn (1999). A cycle
begins with an unemployment spell, which could be right-censored, and ends with a right-censored
or complete ﬁrst job spell after unemployment. Information from job spells beyond the ﬁrst job is
not used.
Table 1contains some descriptive statistics from the sample of spells used in all of the empirical
analysis. Notice that by far the largest proportion of unemployment spells end with a transition
into a job that does not provide health insurance coverage. It is also clear that jobs with health
insurance tend to last longer on average than jobs without health insurance. However, the most
striking diﬀerence is in the average wages of jobs conditional on health insurance provision. Jobs
with health insurance have a mean wage about 54 percent larger than do jobs without health
insurance. The model constructed above is, on the face of it, consistent with all of these descriptive
statistics, and in the following section we describe our attempt to recover the primitive parameters
of the model from these data.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
We now turn our attention to the development of the econometric speciﬁcation used to estimate the
parameters of the stationary search model developed above. Throughout we will make parametric
assumptions concerning the matching distribution and will estimate the parameters of the model
using relatively standard maximum likelihood methods. The complexity of the model structure
requires us to spend some time developing the likelihood function and discussing identiﬁcation
issues, particularly since it it widely appreciated that the identiﬁcation of bargaining models is
challenging given the types of data to which we have access.
The building blocks of the likelihood function are labor market “cycles,” where a cycle is deﬁned
as a sequence of labor market states beginning with an unemployment spell and ending with the
last job prior to the following unemployment spell for a given individual. As discussed above, due
to the complexity of the likelihood function and data limitations, cycles are truncated after the
ﬁrst job spell in an employment spell. The reason for this has to do with an “aliasing” problem
that exists with respect to wage observations. Since our model of on-the-job search allows for
wage increases during a job spell in response to meeting potential employers with associated match
values high enough to improve the employee’s compensation at her current ﬁrm but not so high as
to induce turnover, in order to estimate the model using all job spell information requires access to
a complete, continuously-observed wage history. While the SIPP data contains wage information
collected on a monthly basis, it is not continuous and on inspection seems so variable as to raise
questions concerning its accuracy. As a result, in estimating the model we use information only
on the duration of the unemployment spell, the ﬁrst job spell, the wage rate and health insurance
status on the ﬁrst job in the employment spell, and the reason that the ﬁrst job spell ends. After
making an assumption regarding the value of the bargaining power parameter α and an assumption
regarding the functional form of G, this information will be suﬃcient to identify all the parameters of
the model. Given these estimates, later in the paper we will simulate some wage-health insurance
paths to assess the degree to which the model is capable of generating “realistic” labor market
17histories in terms of wage and health insurance coverage patterns.
In addition, for the econometric model to be consistent with the data, it is necessary for us to
introduce measurement error both in wage rates and health insurance status. The measurement
error processes are assumed to be independent of one another. In terms of wages, we assume that
measured wages,  w, are related to true wages by
 w = wε,
where ε is independently and identically distributed on the positive real line with distribution
function F and density f. In terms of health insurance status, we assume that reported status  d is
equal to the true status d with probability q; note that this is restrictive since we assume that the
probability of mismeasuring health insurance status is independent of the true state.
We now consider the speciﬁcation of all of the “types” of likelihood contributions which can be
observed given the data to which we limit our attention.4 The types are:
1. A right-censored unemployment spell
2. A completed unemployment spell followed by a right-censored one-job employment spell
3. A completed unemployment spell followed by a one-job employment spell in which the job
ends in termination
4. A completed unemployment spell followed by a ﬁrst job spell which is immediately followed
by a second job.
We consider each of these cases in turn:
Case 1: If the cycle consists only of a right-censored unemployment spell of duration tu, then
the likelihood contribution is given by







Case 2: The dependent variables in this case are (tu,t 1,w 1,d 1), but since w1 and d1 are measured
with error, the likelihood contribution is deﬁned in terms of


tu,t 1,  w1,  d1

. The likelihood of a






of an observed wage and health insurance pair (w1,d 1) and a right-censored ﬁrst job spell of duration
t1 is derived as follows.
When an unemployed agent takes a job with health insurance status d, we know that the wage
is given by wd (θ,θ∗) where wd is the equilibrium wage function for a job with health insurance
status, d.5 Recognizing that the mapping (w,d)=n(θ,θ∗) is 1-1, we can deﬁne a function
4For the model without OTJ search,we assume that all transitions from employment are into the unemployment
state. In terms of the likelihood contributions derived below,this assumption implies that cases 3 and 4 are identical.
5The estimation procedure requires that we solve for the equilibrium wage functions, wd (θ,θ
∗) and the critical
matches, θ
∗ and θ
∗∗. Since the computational burden of the Nash bargaining problem with OTJ search is substantial,
we simplify the analysis by approximating the system of value functions and solve for the equilibrium of the model
using our approximations. See Appendix for details. For the model without OTJ search,the equilibrium of the
model has a closed form. That is,we know the equilibrium wage functions,the ﬁxed point equation to solve for
the critical match out of unemployment,and the relationship between the critical match for the provision of health
insurance and the parameters of the model.
18 θ(w,d,θ∗)=w−1
d (w,θ∗) for all (w,d) pairs. Therefore, the distribution of wages and health
insurance status for individuals entering the current job from the unemployment state is given by












































































m(w,d =1 )dw}1− d
The probability density  m is only deﬁned with respect to measured information concerning the
compensation package on the ﬁrst job after unemployment, and not the duration of that job. Since
we know the mapping  θ(w,d,θ∗) for all (w,d) pairs, we know the rate of leaving the ﬁrst job after
unemployment for an individual paid a wage w with health insurance status d is given by













































exp(−he (w,1,θ∗)t1)m(w,d =1 )dw}1− d.










 w1,  d1,t 1 | θ∗

× fu (tu).
Case 3: If an unemployment spell ends with a job and the individual is terminated at the
end of the ﬁrst job [which then initiates another employment cycle since a new unemployment
19spell is begun], then the likelihood contribution is deﬁned with respect to the dependent variables 

 w1,  d1,t 1,t u

. Given the true value of the match in the ﬁrst job, θ1, the likelihood that the job





where η(θ)=χ[θ ≤ θ∗∗]η1 + χ[θ∗ ≤ θ<θ ∗∗]η0. Since the conditional [on θ] density of time to
termination given that the individual is terminated is










f (t1,u| θ1)=f (t1 | θ1,u) × p(u | θ1)
= η (θ1)exp(−η(θ1)t1).




































































 w1,  d1,t 1 | θ∗

× fu (tu).
Case 4: This is very similar to Case 3. The likelihood of exiting from the ﬁrst job in the spell






while the conditional density of ﬁrst job duration given exit directly into another one is









f (t1,e| θ1)=f (t1 | θ1,e) × p(e | θ1)










































































 w1,  d1,t 1 | θ∗

× fu (tu).







where Sj is the set of all “cycles” of type j in the sample. Note that sample members contribute
diﬀerent numbers of cycles of diﬀerent types, but under our i.i.d. assumptions all are simply pooled
in forming the log likelihood function. Thus the consistency of our estimator relies on there being
no unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, for example.
It is well-known that it is diﬃcult to identify the bargaining power parameter α with access to
data such as ours. Since the value of the bargaining power parameter is not of central concern to
this analysis, we assume symmetry and set α =0 .5. The estimates of other parameters will not
be invariant to our assumption regarding the value of α, and the reader should bear this in mind
when interpreting our estimates.
We should also point out that we estimate the unemployment utility ﬂow, b, and the health
insurance premium, φ. In computing the likelihood, it is necessary to solve for the equilibrium
wage functions, the critical match for transitions out of nonemployment, θ∗, and the critical match
for the provision of health insurance, θ∗∗. Our strategy is to estimate the critical matches as
free parameters and to use the theoretical implications of the model to back out estimates of the
unemployment utility ﬂow and the health insurance premium.
Our ﬁnal caveat in concluding this section. For our estimator to be consistent, it is necessary
that the ﬁrst job wage rate be the one initially paid at the time the job was taken. This is because
the likelihood speciﬁcation is predicated on the “threat point” value of θ being the reservation
value θ∗. If several contacts have been made [all with match values less than θ1], the wage will be
higher than the original wage rate on the job which was deﬁned with respect to θ∗. Since we have
monthly observations on wage rates, we believe that the ﬁrst month’s wage on the new job after
unemployment is the one deﬁned with respect to θ∗.
215 Results and Simulations
This section presents the estimation results based on the econometric model discussed in the previ-
ous section. Although our interest naturally centers on the results obtained from the model which
allows for OTJ search, we also present estimates of the model in which we assume that λe =0for
purposes of comparison and a loose form of sensitivity analysis. It is well-known that with the type
of data available to us identiﬁcation of primitive parameters requires that parametric assumptions
be made regarding the distribution G (Flinn and Heckman, 1982). We assume that the productivity
distribution G(θ) is log normal with parameters µθ and σθ. Furthermore, we assume a log normal
distribution for the measurement error distribution with parameters µε and σε.6 It is exceedingly
diﬃcult to identify the bargaining power parameter α, even after making functional form assump-
tions regarding G. In light of this, we assume symmetry in bargaining power and accordingly set
α =0 .5. Rather than estimate the discount rate (ρ) freely, we ﬁx it at .08 (annualized).
In the ﬁrst subsection we report and discuss model estimates for the no OTJ and the OTJ search
speciﬁcations. Since it is somewhat diﬃcult to interpret the estimates of some of the primitive
paramaters, we also compute estimates of population moments that serve to usefully characterize
the stationary equilibrium. In the following subsection we describe the results of a policy experiment
in which health insurance premiums are systematically reduced from their estimated levels.
5.1 Model Estimates
Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for the model without OTJ search. The ﬁrst
thing to note is that our estimates support the premise of our model that η0 >η 1.7 In particular, our
estimates reveal that a job that provides insurance is almost three times less likely to (exogenously)
dissolve than a job without health insurance. Durations are measured in weeks, so the point
estimate of λ implies that the mean wait between contacts (when unemployed) is about 6 months.
The unemployment utility ﬂow parameter is large and negative, and the estimated cost of health
insurance seems on the high side at 6.753 an hour. As we shall see shortly, these values will change
greatly and assume more reasonable values when we allow for OTJ search.
As was discussed in the previous section, for the model to ﬁt the data required that measurement
error be incorporated. In some sense, the degree of measurement error required to provide an
acceptable degree of ﬁt of the equilibrium model to the data can be considered an index of the
degree of model misspeciﬁcation. The degree of measurement eror in log wage rates, σε, takes a
value (.423) similar to that found in most similar studies. More interesting perhaps is the estimated
amount of error in the measurement of health insurance coverage. The estimate of q is found to
be about .95, so that, in conjunction with the measurement error assumed to be present in wage
rates, only 5 percent of the reports of health insurance coverage are assumed to be incorrect.
In Table 3 we present estimates of the model that allows for OTJ search. Not surprisingly, there
are some large diﬀerences between the estimates of the equilibrium in the model without OTJ search
and with it. Since the models are equivalent for the case in which λe =0 , it is interesting to note
that the point estimate of this parameter implies that a contact between a new potential employer
and a currently employed individual about every 2 years. The standard error of the estimate of λe
6We assume that µε = −.5σ
2
ε to ensure that the observed wage equals the true wage in expectation.
7In our parameterization of the model,the log likelihood would still be well-deﬁned even if the ordering of the
estimated exogenous separation rates was not consistent with our assumption. The incongruity,if you will,would be
seen in an estimated value of the cost of insurance that was negative.
22is suﬃciently small that it is safe to say that employed search is an important part of job turnover,
and that the model estimated without OTJ search is seriously misspeciﬁed.
Allowing for OTJ search results in more reasonable estimates of the utility ﬂow from the un-
employment state and the health insurance premium (although it still seems on the high side at
4.35 an hour). The estimate of the rate of encountering job oﬀers in the unemployed state implies
an average duration between contacts of 35 weeks, and the “exogenous” rate of exit from a job
without health insurance is now estimated to be over 5 times higher that of a job with health
insurance. The estimated value of the equilibrium quantities θ∗ and θ∗∗ are only slightly aﬀected
by the restriction that λe =0 .
The primitive parameters are often diﬃcult to interpret, so in Table 4 we compute some more
easily interpreted statistics computed under the estimated equilibria of the two speciﬁcations. A
number of characteristics of the equilibrium don’t seem to be terribly sensitive to the restriction
that λe =0 . As we would expect, however, some are, such as the average duration of jobs by
health insurance status. With no OTJ search, the average length of jobs without health insurance
is 117 weeks while those with health insurance last on average 216 weeks. However, we know
that the exit process is misspeciﬁed under the assumption of λe =0 . Allowing for the “correct”
process (i.e., λe > 0), the average duration of of jobs without health insurance declines to 85 weeks
while jobs with health insurance last 445 weeks on average. Thus, allowing for OTJ search greatly
increases the disparity between the average durations of jobs by health insurance status. This type
of diﬀerential is often loosely interpreted as being evidence of job lock, though we have shown that
turnover decisions are eﬃcient.
The implied values for the mean and variance of wages are relatively insensitive to the as-
sumption that λe =0 , though some caution is required in interpreting the implications of these
estimates. In the model without OTJ search, the wage distributions that are generated when un-
employed agents accept a wage and health insurance pair oﬀered by an employer are the same that
would be observed in the cross-section at any moment in time. This is not true in the model in
which employed individuals can move up the job ladder without intervening spells of unemployment.
In this case, each conditional (on health insurance status) steady state distribution of wages will
stochastically dominate the corresponding conditional distribution of wages for individuals entering
jobs from the unemployment state. Therefore, the conditional steady state wage distributions are
quite diﬀerent in the no OTJ and OTJ search speciﬁcations.
Given the radical change in the dynamic structure of the equilibrium produced by relaxing the
λe =0restriction, we ﬁnd large diﬀerences in the steady state rates of health insurance coverage
in the general and the employed population. The model with OTJ search implies that in the
steady state 58 percent of the general population is covered by health insurance, while almost 70
percent of employees have health insurance. The corresponding percentages for the no OTJ search
speciﬁcation are 37 and 46 percent. The OTJ search speciﬁcation does a much better job of ﬁtting
the SIPP data and in generating reasonable forecasts of the impacts of policy interventions, as we
shall see in the next subsection.
5.2 Simulations
While the partial equilibrium model we develop and estimate is undeniably highly stylized, we have
attempted to show that it is able to capture many features of the data at our disposal. While no
policy makers explicitly appear in our model, the parameter that we view as being most amenable
23to manipulation is the cost of health insurance.8 We might view changes in the private cost of
providing health insurance cost to be impacted by government programs, but since we do not
model the government revenue-generating process or its objective function, we prefer to think of
reductions in the private cost of health insurance coverage as reﬂecting improvements in delivering
health services.
In Table 5 we present statistics tracing the impact of reductions of varying degrees in φ on the
properties of labor market equilibrium. Estimates from the OTJ search speciﬁcation are used to
perform the experiment.
By looking across the rows of the Table, we can see that changes in φ have quite subtle and
somewhat surprising eﬀects on the equilibrium. In the row presenting the results for θ∗ we see
evidence of some nonmonotonicity as the cost of health insurance declines. The variation in this
decision rule parameter is minor compared to the size of the systematic declines observed in the
critical value θ∗∗; which are to be expected. The manifestation of these eﬀects can be seen in the
third row of the data, which contains information on the probability that a job obtained by an
unemployed searcher will be covered by health insurance. At the model estimates, this probability
is only .3. By the time the health insurance premium is reduced by 80 percent, this probability
has increased to .81. Not unexpectedly, signiﬁcant reductions in the cost of health insurance have
enormous impacts on the likelihood that a new job will oﬀer health insurance; in the limit, as the
cost goes to zero, our model predicts that all jobs would provide health insurance.
We ﬁnd that the steady state unemployment rate is increasing in the cost of health insurance.
The reason seems to be that lower costs of insurance makes lower match value jobs relatively more
attractive while having a small indirect eﬀect on the value of high match value jobs. The impact
on unemployment is small but noticeable.
Even if all jobs provide health insurance, not all individuals would be covered since the beneﬁts
only accrue to the employed. The health insurance coverage rate captures both the impact of low-
ered costs on increased coverage of the employed population and on the steady state unemployment
rate. We see signiﬁcant increases in this coverage rate as the cost of health insurance declines. The
next line reports steady state coverage among the employed population only, and this closely tracks
the coverage patterns for the total population.
High costs of health insurance imply that a relatively small number of new jobs provide insurance
coverage. Since the jobs that provide insurance last a signiﬁcantly greater amount of time than do
those that don’t, and since they are high productivity jobs in equilibrium, this selection mechanism
can result in high average productivity levels of jobs in the steady state. As the health insurance
premium is reduced this selection eﬀect becomes less strong, until in the limit (i.e., φ → 0) it
disappears altogether. Therefore, while reduced health care costs increase coverage rates they may
have negative eﬀects on average steady state productivity levels. We see some indication of this in
the last line of Table 5. While the eﬀects are not large in absolute magnitude, we see that after an
initial gain in average productivity (when costs are reduced by 20 percent), average productivity
declines with further reductions in φ.
We exhibit the tradeoﬀs between steady state coverage rates and mean productivity levels
in Figure 6. From the productivity proﬁle we can see that there exists a unique cost of health
insurance that maximizes the average productivity level in the population, and that the health
8Through changes in the costs of search,it may be possible to manipulate the utility ﬂow in the unemployment
state, b, as well. Since changes in b will only have indirect eﬀects on the health insurance coverage decision,we ignore
this possible policy instrument in what follows.
24insurance premium that maximizes mean productivity is high. This analysis makes clear some of
the potential tradeoﬀs, in this case between enrollment rates and productivity, that a policy maker
manipulating the value of φ may face.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Researchers investigating the relationship between employer-provided health insurance, wages, and
turnover, have uncovered a number of empirical ﬁndings (not all of which are mutually consistent)
that to date have not be explicable within an estimable dynamic model of labor market equilibrium.
We propose such a model, and show that it has implications for labor market careers broadly
consistent with the existing empirical evidence on the subject. Using SIPP data we estimate the
model and, for the most part, obtain reasonable results. The model is able to capture some of the
most salient features of the data without undue reliance on the introduction of measurement error
and other artiﬁcial devices introduced solely to improve its ﬁt.
We use model estimates to perform a limited experiment involving reductions in the cost of
health insurance; given the current equilibrium framework, we view these cost reductions as arising
from exogenous technological change. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that reductions in the cost of
health insurance result in substantial increases in coverage rates in both the employed and total
populations. More interesting is the impact on productivity. As costs decrease, lower quality jobs
are covered by health insurance and therefore last longer, on average, than they would have were
the costs suﬃciently high. There is an adverse selection mechanism at work that can result in
lower mean steady state productivity when the cost of insurance decreases. We hasten to point out
that this eﬀect is solely a result of the manner in which we have introduced the health insurance
productivity eﬀect into the model. An alternative mechanism, for example, would be to have
matches with health insurance to result in increased “instantaneous” productivity, e.g., θ(d)=kdθ,
k>1. In such a case we would have an equilibrium with many of the same qualitative properties as
the one analyzed here, but in this case reductions in health insurance costs will in general lead to
substantial productivity gains. In future work we plan to reanalyze the equilibrium under various
speciﬁcations of the role of health insurance in the production technology.
We view one of the accomplishments of this paper as demonstrating theoretically and empirically
that what may appear to be “job lock” is consistent with an equilibrium model in which all turnover
is eﬃcient. While we didn’t emphasize the point, the model estimated here is innovative on at least
two dimensions. First, we have estimated an equilibrium model in which jobs are (endogenously)
diﬀerentiated along two dimensions: wages and health insurance provision. Second, the model
allows for wage renegotiations with the employee’s current ﬁrm. While empirical implementations
of matching models (e.g., Miller, 1984; Flinn, 1986) are consistent with wage changes during an
employment spell, they imply no dependence between the wages paid at successive employers. The
bargaining model formulated and estimated here oﬀers a more complete view of wage dynamics
than others currently available in the literature.
25A Approximation of Decision Rules in the OTJ Search Model
In this appendix, we present our strategy for deriving the equilibrium of the Nash bargaining model
with OTJ search. The computational burden of solving this model is quite substantial and since
estimation of the model requires knowledge of the equilibrium wage functions, wd (θ,θ∗) and the
critical matches, θ∗ and θ∗∗, we are forced to approximate the system of value functions to estimate
the model with OTJ search. In doing so, we are able to easily solve for the equilibrium of the model
without an excessive computational burden.
To begin, it is important to note that maximum value of θ for which the contract (w,d) would
leave the ﬁrm with no proﬁt equals  θ(w,d)=w + dφ and the equilibrium wage associated with
the worker receiving all the rents from θ is w∗ (θ,θ)=θ − dφ. Given these two implications of the
model, we know that
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Taking the ﬁrst order Taylor series approximation to Vf and Ve with respect to w (around w =
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Plugging the equilibrium wage into the approximations to the value functions, we see that the
































Given this result, we can rewrite the threat point (conditional on health insurance status d)a s
Qd (θ)=
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.
Since our particular focus (due to the data that we are using) is bargaining out of the nonem-
ployment state, let us deﬁne the function xd (θ)=Qd (θ) − Vn which can be shown to equal
xd (θ)=












ρ + ηd + αλe  G(θ)
In order to compute the critical matches, θ∗ for transitions out of nonemployment and θ∗∗ for the
provision of health insurance, we solve the two ﬁxed point equations
x0 (θ∗)=0 (17)
x1 (θ∗∗)=x0 (θ∗∗), (18)
where equation (17) deﬁnes indiﬀerence between unemployed search and employment at (θ∗,θ∗)
and equation (18) deﬁnes indiﬀerence between employment with insurance and employment without
insurance. These equations translate into the pair of ﬁxed point equations:
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Writing the value of nonemployment as,













we can see that














27In addition, the second ﬁxed point equation can be rewritten as
0=θ∗∗ −

ρ + η0 + αλe  G(θ∗∗)
η0 − η1
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Finally, by taking linear approximations of the xd (θ) functions, which are given by,
 x0 (θ)=0 +
(θ − θ∗)
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics
Statistic
Number of right censored unemployment spells 148
Number of transitions from unemployment to a job with insurance 419
Number of right censored job spells with insurance 319
Number of transitions from insured job to unemployment 42
Number of transitions from insured job to another job 58
Number of transitions from unemployment to a job without insurance 857
Number of right censored job spells with insurance 498
Number of transitions from uninsurd job to unemployment 196
Number of transitions from uninsured job to another job 163
Mean right censored unemployment duration 43.39 (33.20)
Mean uncensored unemployment duration 32.76 (31.47)
Mean right censored insured job spell duration 73.81 (38.19)
Mean uncensored insured job spell duration 36.53 (29.98)
Mean right censored uninsured job spell duration 55.75 (38.71)
Mean uncensored uninsured job spell duration 28.55 (23.01)
Mean wage for jobs with insurance 11.46 (6.22)
Mean wage for jobs without insurance 7.43 (5.13)
Note: Based on the 1990 to 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The
sample excludes all individuals who were self-employed, attended school, served in the military, or
participated in any welfare program over the length of the survey. Wages are hourly and spell
durations are in weeks.
29Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates without on-the-job search
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Dissolution rate for jobs with insurance, η1 0.004631 0.000371
Dissolution rate for jobs without insurance, η0 0.008556 0.000427
Unemployed worker-ﬁrm match rate, λ 0.041175 0.011928
Mean log productivity level, µθ 1.958298 0.639748
Standard deviation of log productivity levels, σθ 0.950106 0.420361
Critical match out of unemployment, θ∗ 5.006112 0.684493
Critical match for the provision of health insurance, θ∗∗ 15.618906 2.761807
Standard deviation of measurement error distribution, σε 0.426765 0.030229
Probability health insurance measured correctly, q 0.950512 0.027814
Unemployment utility ﬂow, b -6.020611 5.678204
Health insurance premium, φ 6.753304 2.965559
Note: Estimates based on the following assumptions: the annual discount rate is set to 0.08, the
bargaining power parameter is set to 0.5, and the measurement error distribution is log normal
with mean 1. Standard errors on the unemployment utility ﬂow and the health insurance premium
are computed using the asymptotic distribution of the other parameters.
Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates with on-the-job search
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Dissolution rate for jobs with insurance, η1 0.001105 0.000304
Dissolution rate for jobs without insurance, η0 0.006138 0.000453
Unemployed worker-ﬁrm match rate, λ 0.028712 0.002617
Employed worker-ﬁrm match rate, λe 0.009921 0.002443
Mean log productivity level, µθ 2.372048 0.182393
Standard deviation of log productivity levels, σθ 0.551677 0.078487
Critical match out of unemployment, θ∗ 4.908189 0.735607
Critical match for the provision of health insurance, θ∗∗ 14.800773 1.448271
Standard deviation of measurement error distribution, σε 0.424127 0.021616
Probability health insurance measured correctly, q 0.914059 0.019368
Unemployment utility ﬂow, b -2.101609 1.871326
Health insurance premium, φ 4.347064 1.138715
Note: Estimates based on the following assumptions: the annual discount rate is set to 0.08, the
bargaining power parameter is set to 0.5, and the measurement error distribution is log normal
with mean 1. Standard errors on the unemployment utility ﬂow and the health insurance premium
are computed using the asymptotic distribution of the other parameters.
30Table 4: Implied Parameter Estimates
Statistic OTJ search No OTJ search
Probability job provides health insurance, p(d =1 ) 0.3031 0.3155
Mean unemployment duration 37.7912 37.7837
Mean duration for jobs with insurance 444.5612 215.9491
Mean duration for jobs without insurance 84.6771 116.8716
Mean wage for jobs with insurance 12.4007 12.1294
Mean wage for jobs without insurance 7.1435 7.1630
Steady state unemployment rate 0.1632 0.2032
Steady state health insurance coverage rate 0.5819 0.3665
Steady state coverage rate of employed population 0.6954 0.4599
Note: Durations are measured in weeks and wages are hourly. The estimates on mean wages takes
into account the measurement error distribution.
Table 5: Policy Simulations: Changes in the Health Insurance Premium
Percent Decrease
Statistic Baseline 20% 40% 60% 80%
θ∗ 4.910 4.927 4.867 4.699 4.415
θ∗∗ 14.805 13.300 11.604 9.603 7.136
p(d =1 ) 0.303 0.378 0.480 0.622 0.814
Unemployment rate 0.163 0.157 0.151 0.144 0.138
Health insurance coverage rate 0.582 0.632 0.688 0.749 0.815
Coverage rate of employed population 0.696 0.750 0.809 0.875 0.945
Mean productivity 13.635 13.668 13.635 13.527 13.346
Note: Simulations are based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job search
presented in Table 3.
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Note: Based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job search
presented in Table 3. The dotted vertical lines represent the critical matches for
transitions out of unemployment and for the provision of health insurance,
respectively.













Note: The wage functions represent the first wage following an unemployment
spell. Figure is based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job
search presented in Table 3.33



















Note: Based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job search
presented in Table 3. Wages represent the first wage reported in the first job
following an unemployment spell.
















Note: Based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job search
presented in Table 3. Wages represent the first reported wage in the first job
following an unemployment spell. The dotted vertical lines represent the
minimum wage paid in a job that provides health insurance and the maximum
wage paid in a job that does not provide insurance, respectively.34





















Note: Based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-the-job search
presented in Table 3. Wages represent the first wage in the first job following
an unemployment spell. The hazard rate equals the weekly rate of exiting the
current employment state, either through a dismissal to unemployment or a job
change.
















































Note: Simulations are based on the parameter estimates for the model with on-
the-job search presented in Table 3. The definitions of mean productivity and
coverage rate are contained in the text.References
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